The notion of actuality in Kierkegaard and Schelling's influence by Stewart, Jon
arS BrEviS 2011
237
thE notion oF actuaLity in KiErKEgaard and SchELLing’S inFLuEncE
thE notion oF actuaLity in KiErKEgaard 
and SchELLing’S inFLuEncE
JON STEWART
Søren Kierkegaard Research Centre
Copenhagen University
ABSTRACT: Historians of philosophy have long regarded Kierkegaard 
as one of the most important forerunners of twentieth-century 
existentialism. One obvious reason for this is his rejection of abstraction 
and system-building and his insistence on the sphere of existence 
and actuality. One of his most famous criticisms of German idealism 
(and Hegel in particular) is that it neglects the realm of actuality, 
which cannot be captured by abstract concepts. His emphasis on 
the immediate lived experience of the individual seems to be at the 
opposite end of the philosophical spectrum from any form of idealism. 
What is interesting about this criticism is that it seems, at least in 
part, to be inspired by another German idealist, namely Schelling. 
This paper explores this criticism and attempts to come to terms 
with its implications. It is argued that this amounts to a somewhat 
unphilosophical criticism and that Kierkegaard does not end up with 
a philosophically plausible position, despite whatever merits it may 
have for the individual religious believer.
El concepto de actualidad en Kierkegaard 
y la influencia de Schelling
RESUMEN: Los historiadores de la filosofía vienen considerando a 
Kierkegaard, desde hace ya algún tiempo, como uno de los precursores 
más importantes del existencialismo del siglo veinte. Una razón obvia 
para tal consideración puede hallarse en su rechazo de la abstracción 
y la construcción sistemática, así como su insistencia en la esfera de la 
existencia y la realidad. Una de las críticas más famosas que dirigió al 
idealismo alemán (Hegel en particular) es, así, por despreciar el reino 
de aquella realidad que no puede ser captada mediante conceptos 
abstractos. Su énfasis en la experiencia del individuo, inmediatamente 
vivida, parece encontrarse en el extremo opuesto de cualquier forma 
de idealismo. Lo que resulta interesante acerca de esta crítica es que 
parece, al menos en parte, haber sido sugerida por otro idealista 
alemán, concretamente Schelling. El presente artículo se adentra en 
esta crítica y trata de dilucidar sus implicaciones. Se argumenta que 
lleva a un criticismo en buena medida a-filosófico, y que Kierkegaard no 
alcanza ninguna posición filosóficamente plausible, por muchos que sean 
los méritos que pueda tener para el creyente, para el individuo religioso.  
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Historians of philosophy have long regarded Kierkegaard as one of 
the most important forerunners of twentieth-century existentialism. 
One obvious reason for this is his rejection of abstraction and system-
building and his insistence on the sphere of existence and actuality. 
One of his most famous criticisms of German idealism (and Hegel 
in particular) is that it neglects the realm of actuality, which cannot 
be captured by abstract concepts. His emphasis on the immediate 
lived experience of the individual seems to be at the opposite end 
of the philosophical spectrum from any form of idealism. What is 
interesting about this criticism is that it seems, at least in part, to be 
inspired by another German idealist, namely Schelling.
In this paper I wish to explore this criticism and attempt to come to 
terms with its implications. I wish to argue that in fact this amounts 
to a somewhat unphilosophical criticism and that Kierkegaard 
does not end up with a philosophically plausible position, despite 
whatever merits it may have for the individual religious believer.
I. The Young Kierkegaard and the Concept of Actuality
While Kierkegaard was a student at the University of Copenhagen 
in the 1830s, he, like many Danish students of the period, looked 
up to the professor Frederik Christian Sibbern, who was the leading 
figure in Danish philosophy during the period. Kierkegaard’s 
deference was not misplaced. Sibbern was a major thinker, judged 
by the standards of any time. His philosophy was profoundly and 
decisively influenced by German idealism. He had personally met 
Fichte, Schleiermacher, Goethe, Solger, Schopenhauer and Steffens 
during a long journey to Prussia and the German states from 1811-
1813.1 Of particular importance was his encounter with Schelling in 
Munich in 1813. Schelling would prove to be the decisive influence 
in Sibbern’s philosophical development.2 
Sibbern’s philosophy was very much modeled on the paradigm of 
philosophical enquiry that was current in Prussia and the German 
states at the time. One aspect of this was his development and use 
of a very idiosyncratic and difficult philosophical jargon, partly 
borrowed from ancient philosophy and German idealism but also 
1 See Jon Stewart, A History of Hegelianism in Golden Age Denmark, Tome I, The 
Heiberg Period: 1824-1836, Copenhagen: C.A. Reitzel 2007 (Danish Golden Age Studies, 
vol. 3), pp. 98-102.
2 Carl Henrik Koch, “F.C. Sibbern,” in his Den Danske Idealisme 1800-1880, Copen-
hagen: Gyldendal 2004, pp. 87-160; see pp. 94ff.
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party self-created, full of enigmatic neologisms.3 He was in many 
ways very much a school or university philosopher. This is perhaps 
one of the reasons why he (and indeed others at the university) were 
somewhat irritated by the unscholarly tone of parts of Kierkegaard’s 
master’s thesis The Concept of Irony. In a letters circulated among 
Kierkegaard’s dissertation committee and commented upon by each 
of the members, Sibbern laments,
Indeed, one might wish that our author’s idea were carried 
through with more precision than seems to me to have been 
the case with all these efforts at bringing forth everything in 
order to clarify it—which is what we see here in our author, 
whose work has thereby taken on large proportions. With 
respect to various details, it would certainly be desirable that 
in the final revision of the dissertation a few things that are 
appropriate to a lower sort of genre could be trimmed away 
as luxuriant growths.4
This demonstrates clearly that Sibbern represented a very different 
kind of mindset from Kierkegaard, in any case from the young 
Kierkegaard. Sibbern represented the standard practice of philosophy 
of the period, whereas the young Kierkegaard found this form of 
philosophy increasingly dissatisfying.
This constitutes the background for an intriguing encounter 
between Sibbern and the young Kierkegaard presumably from this 
period when Kierkegaard was still a student.5 In connection with 
3 Sibbern apparently had a notorious reputation for his difficult manner of 
expression among the generations of students which he taught at the University of 
Copenhagen. This prompted one of them to create a dictionary of Sibbernisms. See 
Hans Dahl, Frederik Christian Sibbern og Modersmålet. Et Stykke Dansk Ordbogsarbejde, 
Copenhagen: G.E.C. Gad 1884.
4 Quoted from Encounters with Kierkegaard: A Life as Seen By His Contemporaries, 
trans. and ed. by Bruce H. Kirmmse, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1996, p. 
29. See also Carl Weltzer’s “Omkring Søren Kierkegaards Disputats,” in Kirkehistoriske 
Samlinger, sixth series, ed. by J. Oskar Andersen and Bjørn Kornerup. Copenhagen: 
G.E.C. Gads Forlag 1948-50, pp. 284-311.
5 Sibbern himself underscores that his memory for dates is somewhat faded and 
thus he cannot pinpoint exactly the date of this exchange. But he notes, “But my 
daughter tells me that Kierkegaard was visiting us even as early as when we lived on 
Chrystalgade—that is, between 1831 and 1836. These were undoubtedly his early 
years as a university student, if, as I assume, he entered the university in 1833.” H.P. 
Barfod (ed.), “Indledende Notiser,” in his Af Søren Kierkegaards Efterladte Papirer. 1833-
1843, Copenhagen: C.A. Reitzels Forlag 1869, pp. lii-liii. In English in Encounters with 
Kierkegaard: A Life as Seen by His Contemporaries, trans. and ed. by Bruce H. Kirmmse, 
Princeton: Princeton University Press 1996, p. 217.
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his edition of Kierkegaard’s Nachlass, Hans Peter Barfod (1834-92) 
solicited biographical information from people who knew him. In 
this connection he contacted Sibbern and asked him if he could 
give some information about his interaction with Kierkegaard. In a 
letter dated September 19, 1869, Sibbern writes back to Barfod and 
gives some minor anecdotes about events or conversations that he 
can remember. The first concrete event that he recalls is meeting 
Kierkegaard on the square where the latter lived. Sibbern recounts 
the following about their exchange: “I do remember, however, that 
once during his Hegelian period, he met me at Gammeltorv [sc. 
the old market] and asked me what relationship obtained between 
philosophy and actuality [Virkelighed], which astonished me, because 
the gist of the whole of my philosophy was the study of life and 
actuality [Virkelighed].”6 One can see Kierkegaard, already at this early 
period, struggling with the issue. He felt that philosophy should 
have something meaningful to say about actuality and existence in 
his existential understanding of these terms. He felt dissatisfaction 
with the way in which philosophy seemed to escape into abstractions 
and to ignore these issues, thus losing touch with actuality. Given 
this, it was natural for him to ask Sibbern, perhaps even in a slightly 
critical manner, to explain this relation. The old professor failed to 
understand the question since, according to his conception, there 
was no radical split between philosophical explanation and actuality 
and never had been. The reason for this is clearly that Kierkegaard is 
operating with a somewhat different conception of “actuality” than 
Sibbern. For Sibbern it was obvious that the entire philosophical 
enterprise was trying to give and account of actuality, but this was 
“actuality” understood in a more general, indeed, more abstract 
sense, and not “actuality” in terms of the individual’s own existential 
relation to the world. When seen in this light, Kierkegaard’s implied 
criticism is in a sense question begging since he has already assumed 
his own special understanding of “actuality” and then been 
disappointed that Sibbern cannot account for it. But Kierkegaard 
has not, at least in this context, given any independent argument 
for his use of the term.
What is particularly intriguing about this passage is what Sibbern 
goes on to say. In the passage already cited, he casually refers to 
6 H.P. Barfod (ed.), “Indledende Notiser,” in his Af Søren Kierkegaards Efterladte Pa-
pirer. 1833-1843, Copenhagen: C.A. Reitzels Forlag 1869, pp. lii-liii. In English in 
Encounters with Kierkegaard: A Life as Seen by His Contemporaries, trans. and ed. by 
Bruce H. Kirmmse, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1996, p. 217. Translation 
slightly modified.
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Kierkegaard’s “Hegelian period,” which can presumably be taken to 
be around this time when he was a student or was perhaps in the 
process of writing his dissertation. During this time he was reading 
a number of important works by Hegel such as the Lectures on the 
Philosophy of History,7 Lectures on the History of Philosophy,8 Lectures 
on Aesthetics,9 the Philosophy of Right10 and the review of Solger’s 
posthumous writings.11 Aware of Kierkegaard’s current occupation 
with Hegel, Sibbern finds here the key to the motivation behind 
Kierkegaard’s question: “But subsequently I, of course, realized that 
the question was a natural one for a Hegelianized thinker, because 
the Hegelians did not study philosophy existentially….”12 Given 
Kierkegaard’s Hegelian point of view, he was dissatisfied since 
Hegel did not seem to give an adequate account of “actuality” as 
he understood it. Sibbern, himself coming from the perspective of 
Schelling’s philosophy, shared in many ways Schelling’s criticism 
of Hegel on this point. (Indeed, in 1838 he would publish an 
entire book about Hegel’s philosophy, which was largely critical: 
Remarks and Investigations Primarily Concerning Hegel’s Philosophy.13) 
In this criticism he then naturally sees the root of Kierkegaard’s 
7 Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte, ed. by Eduard Gans. Berlin 
1837, vol. 9 in Hegel’s Werke. Vollständige Ausgabe, vols. 1-18, Berlin 1832-45.
8 Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie, I-III, ed. by Karl Ludwig 
Michelet. Berlin 1833-36, vols. 13-15 in Hegel’s Werke. Vollständige Ausgabe, vols. 1-18, 
Berlin 1832-45. ASKB 557-559.
9 Hegel, Vorlesungen über Aesthetik, I-III, ed. by Heinrich Gustav Hotho. Berlin 
1835-38, vols. 10-1, 10-2, 10-3 in Hegel’s Werke. Vollständige Ausgabe, vols. 1-18, Berlin 
1832-45. ASKB 1384-1386.
10 Hegel, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts oder Naturrecht und Staatswissen-
schaft im Grundrisse, ed. by Eduard Gans. Berlin 1833 (Zweite Auflage 1840), vol. 8, in 
Hegel’s Werke. Vollständige Ausgabe, vols. 1-18, Berlin 1832-45. ASKB 551.
11 Hegel, “Über Solger’s nachgelassene Schriften und Briefwechsel. Herausgegeben von 
Ludwig Tieck und Friedrich von Raumer. Erster Band 780 S. mit Vorr. XVI S. Zweiter 
Band 784 S. Leipzig, 1826,” Jahrbücher für wissenschaftliche Kritik, Erster Artikel (March 
1828), no. 51-52, pp. 403-416, no. 53-54, pp. 417-428; Zweiter Artikel (June 1828), 
no. 105-106, pp. 838-848, no. 107-108, pp. 849-864, no. 109-110, pp. 865-870. Re-
printed in Vermischte Schriften, I-II, ed. by Friedrich Förster and Ludwig Boumann, 
Berlin 1834-35, vols. 16-17 in Hegel’s Werke. Vollständige Ausgabe, vols. 1-18, Berlin 
1832-45, vol. 16, (1834) pp. 436-506. ASKB 555-556. In Jub. vol. 20, pp. 132-202.
12 H.P. Barfod (ed.), “Indledende Notiser,” in his Af Søren Kierkegaards Efterladte 
Papirer. 1833-1843, Copenhagen: C.A. Reitzels Forlag 1869, pp. lii-liii. Cited from 
Encounters with Kierkegaard, trans. and ed. by Bruce H. Kirmmse, op. cit., “Letter F.C. 
Sibbern to H.P. Barfod,” September 19, 1869, p. 217. Translation slightly modified. 
See also JP, vol. 2, 1592; SKS, vol. 19, p. 245, Not8:51.
13 Frederik Christian Sibbern, Bemærkninger og Undersøgelser fornemmelig betræffende 
Hegels Philosophie, betragtet i Forhold til vor Tid. Copenhagen 1838.
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dissatisfaction. For Sibbern, the problem was that Kierkegaard was 
taking Hegel’s philosophy to be philosophy in general, which was in 
some ways natural since the young student was at the time immersed 
in Hegel. But, for Sibbern, what was really at issue was a shortcoming 
in Hegel’s philosophy and not in the philosophical enterprise as such. 
This exchange clearly shows the young Kierkegaard struggling with 
this issue. Sibbern’s interpretation of the matter seems to be confirmed 
by a remark that Kierkegaard makes in his first book, From the Papers 
of One Still Living. As is well known, this work was originally written 
as a review article intended for publication in Johan Ludvig Heiberg’s 
Hegelian journal Perseus.14 Kierkegaard inserted specific proHegelian 
statements in the text, either because he genuinely believed them or 
because he thought his chances of getting the article approved for 
publication would thereby be enhanced. In any case, at the beginning 
of the work he discusses in a somewhat odd manner the question of 
the beginning of philosophy and Hegel’s attempt to begin without 
presuppositions or with nothing. In this context he writes, “the entire 
recent literature….has forgotten that the beginning with nothing 
of which Hegel speaks was mastered by himself in the system and 
was by no means a failure to appreciate the great richness actuality 
has.”15 The last part of this statement is particularly intriguing. At the 
time Hegel’s philosophy was being discussed critically by some of the 
leading Danish intellectuals of the day, and the young Kierkegaard 
followed these discussions. Here he appears, wholly in line with 
Sibbern’s assessment as a “Hegelianized thinker.” In short, he seems 
quite convinced of the merits of Hegel’s philosophy. With the last 
sentence in the passage quoted, he acknowledges indirectly that 
Hegel’s philosophy has been reproached for “a failure to appreciate the 
great richness actuality.” But here he goes out of his way to underscore 
that this is “by no means” the case. If we take this to be an authentic 
representation of Kierkegaard’s view at the time, then it would seem to 
imply that he at this point was still convinced that Hegel’s philosophy 
could capture the truth of actuality. However, as Kierkegaard came 
to develop his own existential conception of this term, he began to 
struggle with the question of how adequate Hegel’s philosophy really 
managed to account for it. This then would account for the exchange 
with Sibbern on Gammeltorv.
14 See Jon Stewart, A History of Hegelianism in Golden Age Denmark, Tome II, The 
Martensen Period: 1837-1842, Copenhagen: C.A. Reitzel 2007 (Danish Golden Age Stud-
ies, vol. 3), pp. 270-277.
15 EPW, p. 62; SKS, vol. 1, p. 18.
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These are issues that Kierkegaard continued to struggle with for 
many years. But his position became clearer and clearer over time 
as he developed his own conception of the existential categories 
of actuality and existence in large part in opposition to the strictly 
abstract treatment of these terms in German philosophy at the 
time. (One could perhaps argue that in the later Kierkegaard this is 
also accompanied by a somewhat caricatured view of the abstract 
speculative thinker, which only partially overlaps with any actual 
philosophical position or person but rather is used by him merely as 
a kind of polemical whipping boy in order to help him to develop 
his own views.)
II. Schelling’s Account of Actuality in Berlin
As is well known, Kierkegaard went to Berlin after completing his 
dissertation in the fall of 1841 in order, among other things to attend 
Schelling’s lectures. He stayed in Berlin from October 25, 1841 until 
March 6, 1842. The significance of Schelling’s lectures for Kierkegaard 
has been a point of some discussion in the secondary literature.16 
One important aspect of Schelling’s lecture was his criticism of Hegel, 
and it has been claimed that this had an enduring influence on 
Kierkegaard.17
In his lectures Schelling treated the concept of actuality in a way 
that immediately caught Kierkegaard’s attention as being potentially 
a very fruitful approach. While it is known that Kierkegaard soon 
became disappointed with Schelling’s lectures, he was at first entirely 
captivated, and it was Schelling’s account of the category of actuality 
16 Dempf Alois, “Kierkegaard hört Schelling,” Philosophisches Jahrbuch, vol. 65, 
1957, pp. 147-161. Peter Fenves, “The Irony of Revelation: The Young Kierkegaard 
Listens to the Old Schelling,” in The Concept of Irony, ed. by Robert L. Perkins, Macon, 
Georgia: Mercer University Press 2001 (International Kierkegaard Commentary, vol. 2), 
pp. 391-416. Anton Mirko Koktanek, Schellings Seinslehre und Kierkegaard. Mit Erstaus-
gabe der Nachschriften zweier Schellingsvorlesungen G.M. Mittermair und Sören Kierkega-
ard, Munich: R. Oldenbourg 1962. Niels Thulstrup, “Kierkegaard and Schelling’s Phi-
losophy of Revelation,” Kierkegaard and Speculative Idealism, Copenhagen: C.A. Reitzel 
1979 (Bibliotheca Kierkegaardiana, vol. 4), pp. 144-159.
17 Bruno Majoli, “La critica ad Hegel in Schelling e Kierkegaard,” Rivista di Filo-
sofia Neo-Scolastica, vol. 46, 1954, pp. 232-263. Francesco Rinaldi, “Della presenza 
schellinghiana nella critica di Kierkegaard a Hegel,” Studi Urbinati di Storia, Filosofia 
e Letteratura, vol. 43, 1969, pp. 243-262. Michael Theunissen, “Die Dialektik der Of-
fenbarung. Zur Auseinandersetzung Schellings und Kierkegaards mit der Religions-
philosophie Hegels,” Philosophisches Jahrbuch, vol. 72, 1964-1965, pp. 134-160. Niels 
Thulstrup, Kierkegaard’s Relation to Hegel, trans. by George L. Stengren, Princeton: 
Princeton University Press 1980, pp. 267-274.
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(Wirklichkeit) that played a key role in this fascination. In his Notebook 
8, he describes his excitement in hearing Schelling’s initial treatment: 
I’m so glad to have heard Schelling’s 2nd lecture—
indescribable. I have been sighing and the thoughts within 
me have been groaning long enough; when he mentioned 
the word “actuality” concerning philosophy’s relation to the 
actual, the child of thought leaped for joy within me….After 
that I remember almost every word he said. Perhaps here 
there can be clarity. This one word, it reminded me of all my 
philosophical pains and agonies.18
Prior to this period Kierkegaard was already beginning to develop 
his own intuitions about notions such as existence and actuality, 
which he regarded to be somehow fundamentally different from 
the usual abstract categories of logic. Indeed, these terms seemed 
to be a protest against abstract categories and thinking. One recalls 
here Johannes Climacus’ objection in the Concluding Unscientific 
Postscript that speculative philosophy has “forgotten” existence 
and actuality. The objection is that the speculative philosophers 
become so transfixed in abstract thinking that they must entirely 
abstract from themselves as living and breathing individuals. It is 
this immediate experience of simply living that is forgotten in a 
purely conceptual analysis. When he talks about being reminded 
of all of his “philosophical pains and agonies,” this fits well with 
his query to Sibbern. In other words, he felt dissatisfied with 
the philosophy that he studied as a student at the University of 
Copenhagen and in connection with his dissertation. He felt pained 
that philosophy did not seem to be addressing itself to the real 
problems as he perceived them but instead was often concerned with 
pseudoproblems that had nothing to do with real life. Thus since it 
seems clear that Kierkegaard was beginning at this stage to develop 
his own intuitions about this matter, when he heard Schelling 
mention this conception, he was suddenly wholly attentive. He 
immediately thought that he recognized a philosophical kindred 
spirit in Schelling, who likewise was interested in developing a 
more existential understanding of these concepts and who was 
likewise critical of pure, abstract conceptual analysis. This explains 
Kierkegaard’s initial positive reaction and understanding of these 
concepts.
18 KJN 3, 229; SKS 19, p. 235, Not8:33.
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It should be noted that while he was attending Schelling’s lectures, 
he was also regularly going to the lectures of the Hegelian Karl 
Werder, who was giving a course on Hegel’s Science of Logic. In this 
course Kierkegaard could witness firsthand a very abstract analysis of 
the categories of metaphysics. He was presumably already aware of 
this kind of analysis from his own reading of Hegel, but in any case, 
attending Werder’s lectures was almost certainly a fresh reminder 
to him of the limitations of pure conceptual analysis. This would 
have made even stronger the contrast to what Schelling’s philosophy 
seemed to be offering.
In the entry from Notebook 8 cited just above Kierkegaard refers to 
Schelling’s second lecture, where Schelling began his discussion of 
the relation of philosophy to actuality (sometime between November 
15 and 22, 1841). In fact he introduces this discussion under the 
heading “Philosophy and Actuality.”19 Schelling begins by making 
the classical distinction between existence and essence:
Everything actual has a dual aspect: quid sit (what it is), 
quod sit (that it is). Philosophy can thus enter into a dual 
relationship with it; one can have a concept without knowledge 
but no knowledge without the concept. In knowledge there 
is a duality whereby it is recollection. When I see a plant, I 
recollect and refer it to the universal, inasmuch as I recognize 
it as a plant.20
For Schelling “knowledge” amounts to empirical knowledge, 
according to this definition. It is empirical awareness of the existence 
of things in the world, a knowledge that something exists. By 
contrast, conceptual thinking is not knowledge. It is a familiarity 
with a concept but knowledge only comes when one encounters an 
example of that concept in the real world, when one sees or perceives 
something and recognizes it as falling under a specific concept. One 
sees a green, leafy thing, and recognizes it as a plant because one 
has the universal concept of plant in one’s mind ahead of time. 
Kierkegaard writes in the margin, “a concept is expressed by quid sit, 
but from this it does not follow that I know quod sit.”21 Just because 
one is familiar with the concept of dog or plant, it does not follow 
that one has knowledge of a specific dog or plant. This knowledge 
only comes with the empirical encounter with it in perception. 
19 KJN 3, 303; SKS 19, p. 305, Not11:2.
20 KJN 3, 303; SKS 19, p. 305, Not11:2.
21 KJN 3, 303, margin; SKS 19, p. 305, Not11:2a.
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These comments seemed to serve as a kind of wake up call for 
Kierkegaard. He did not take any notes to Schelling’s first lecture 
but only wrote down a single comment.22 For the second lecture he 
notes a bit more, including the passage quoted here. But it is only 
with the third lecture that Kierkegaard seems to take pains to write 
down as much as he can of what Schelling said. From this point on 
his notes become much more thorough.
Schelling goes on to connect this analysis of the relation of 
philosophy to actuality to a criticism of Hegel’s philosophy. Schelling 
criticized Hegel’s philosophy as overly abstract. In Kierkegaard’s 
notes, Schelling is made to say the following:
Hegel himself says: “Logic is a purely subjective science, 
without any content; only the philosopher traverses all these 
stages; its content has nothing actual corresponding to it in 
actuality. Thinking has only itself as content, has the whole 
concretion of actuality outside itself, is, right up to one’s arrival 
at the idea, a shadowy kingdom of pure essence without any 
concretion.” In this he is different from other philosophers; 
for their philosophy found itself immediately in the midst 
of nature, even if not in actual nature. All concepts were a 
priori, such that objects correspond to them; in the Hegelian 
philosophy every relation to actuality is cancelled.23
At some point Kierkegaard became impatient with Schelling, whose 
initial proposal seemed to be so promising. In a letter to his brother 
P.C. Kierkegaard from February 1842, he begins by complaining, 
“Schelling spouts the most insufferable nonsense.”24 He declares 
that he has stopped going to the lectures, and since there is nothing 
left for him to do in Berlin he will return to Copenhagen. Clearly 
an important part of what alienated him from Schelling was the 
feeling of being betrayed or let down by what Schelling subsequently 
went on to say about actuality. While Kierkegaard has initially been 
so excited, he soon realized that his own conception of actuality 
was quite different from that of Schelling and that he had in fact 
been seduced by the latter’s use of the same word. While he was 
in Berlin Kierkegaard was working on his first major work Either/
22 KJN 3, 303; SKS 19, p. 305, Not11:1: “he wished to be regarded as one who, in 
the Greek sense, in the Platonic sense, was dead.”
23 KJN 3, 314; SKS, vol. 19, p. 315, Not11:11.
24 LD, 141, Letter 70; B&A, vol. 1, p. 109.
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Or. His disappointment with Schelling is reflected in one of the 
diapsalmata, which reads “What philosophers say about actuality 
[Virkelighed] is often just as disappointing as it is when one reads 
on a sign in a second-hand shop: Pressing Done Here. If a person 
were to bring his clothes to be pressed, he would be duped, for 
the sign is merely for sale.”25 Kierkegaard himself presumably felt 
duped by Schelling who had led him to believe that he was going 
to be developing a new existential philosophy, while in fact he was 
only engaged in abstract conceptual analysis like the other German 
idealists. Schelling’s theory of potency was, for Kierkegaard, a clear 
demonstration of a reversion to abstractions: “His whole doctrine of 
potencies betrays the highest degree of impotence.”26 He concludes 
his letter to his brother, “I think I might have become utterly stupid 
if I had continued to listen to Schelling.”27 From these comments 
alone it would be difficult to infer that Schelling’s lectures exercised 
any positive influence on Kierkegaard at all.
III. Schelling and Actuality in The Concept of Anxiety
A few years later Kierkegaard takes up the notion of actuality again 
in The Concept of Anxiety under the pseudonym Vigilius Haufniensis. 
This is a particularly important work for our purposes since it is 
the Kierkegaard text where Schelling is mentioned most frequently. 
Moreover, Kierkegaard even refers to Schelling’s Berlin lectures, 
for a moment slipping out of the pseudonymous role of Vigilius 
Haufniensis.28 
The discussion begins in the Introduction to the work with Vigilius 
Haufniensis apparently giving a positive account of the importance 
of systematic, scientific thinking, which he believes is necessary in 
order to avoid confusions in the realm of scholarship. He explains,
The view that every scientific issue within the larger compass 
of science has its definite place, its measure and its limit, and 
thereby its harmonious blending in the world as well as its 
legitimate participation in what is expressed by the whole, is 
not merely a pium desiderium that ennobles the man of science 
25 EO1, 32; SKS 2, 41.
26 LD, 141, Letter 70; B&A, vol. 1, p. 110.
27 LD, 142, Letter 70; B&A, vol. 1, p. 110.
28 CA, 21n; SKS 4, 328n.
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by its enthusiastic and melancholy infatuation. This view is 
not merely a sacred duty that commits him to the service of 
the totality and bids him to renounce lawlessness and the 
adventurous desire to lose sight of the mainland; it also serves 
the interest of every more specialized deliberation, for when the 
deliberation forgets where it properly belongs, as language often 
expresses with striking ambiguity, it forgets itself and becomes 
something else, and thereby acquires the dubious perfectibility 
of being able to become anything and everything.29
When one is familiar with Kierkegaard’s criticism of systematic 
philosophy, it is difficult not to see the irony in this. In any case, he 
has Haufniensis argue that it is of utmost importance to proceed in 
a systematic manner, lest one end up in ambiguities and conceptual 
confusions. Everything should be understood in its proper place in 
the context of the whole. This then leads to the discussion of the 
concept of actuality.
Science should be systematic, with each object being allotted its 
proper place and treated accordingly. A problem arises when one 
tries to incorporate actuality into this systematic account. Vigilius 
Haufniensis makes his thesis clear that actuality does not belong 
among the categories of logic since it is something altogether 
different in kind. He thus rebukes those unnamed scholars who 
include it as a part of their systems of logic:
Thus when an author entitles the last section of the Logic 
“Actuality,” he thereby gains the advantage of making it appear 
that in logic the highest has already been achieved, or if one 
prefers, the lowest. In the meantime, the loss is obvious, for 
neither logic nor actuality is served by placing actuality in the 
Logic. Actuality is not served thereby, for contingency, which 
is an essential part of the actual, cannot be admitted within 
the realm of logic. Logic is not served thereby, for if logic has 
thought actuality, it has included something that it cannot 
assimilate, it has appropriated at the beginning what it should 
only praedisponere. The penalty is obvious. Every deliberation 
about the nature of actuality is rendered difficult, and for a long 
time perhaps made impossible, since the word “actuality” must 
first have time to collect itself, time to forget the mistake.30
29 CA, 9; SKS 4, 317.
30 CA, pp. 9-10; SKS, vol. 4, pp. 317-318. See CA, p. 16fn.; SKS, vol. 4, p. 324fn.: 
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The concrete target of this criticism has been identified with 
A.P. Adler, whose Popular Lectures on Hegel’s Objective Logic,31 in fact 
concludes with a section on “actuality” in contrast to Hegel’s Science 
of Logic.32 The important point is not so much the target of this 
criticism as what it tells us about Kierkegaard’s understanding of 
this concept. 
The criticism concerns what Haufniensis considers to be a confusion 
between different spheres: logic and existence. The Hegelians make 
use of the categories “actuality” and “existence” in their works on 
metaphysics (sc. logic). But, according to Haufniensis, this amounts 
to a serious distortion of these concepts and confuses the relation 
between the two separate spheres. Logic is necessary, but existence 
and actuality are contingent. They thus represent two fundamentally 
different spheres. When existence and actuality are treated in logic, a 
serious conceptual distortion and subsequent confusion takes place. 
Ultimately logic cannot include or “assimilate” actuality, when this 
concept is properly understood. Thus any attempt to do so merely 
leads to misunderstanding. In short it is a distortion of the concept 
of actuality to give it an abstract, conceptual analysis. 
All of this is relevant for the main topic of The Concept of Anxiety, 
namely, sin since sin likewise does not belong to a system or is 
not the object of science: “Sin does not properly belong in any 
science, but it is the subject of the sermon, in which the single 
individual speaks as the single individual to the single individual.”33 
The attempt in dogmatics to give an account of sin must thus begin 
with actuality.34 For Hauniensis, sin is an action; it belongs to the 
realm of actuality (and not to necessity or the realm of logic)” “sin 
is not a state. Its idea is that its concept is continually annulled. As 
“If this is considered more carefully, there will be occasions enough to notice the 
brilliance of heading the last section of the Logic ‘Actuality,’ inasmuch as ethics never 
reaches it. The actuality with which logic ends means, therefore, no more in regard 
to actuality than the ‘being’ with which it begins.” See also JP, vol. 3, 3653; Pap. V 
B 49.1: “Thus when an author entitles the last section of the Logic ‘actuality’ which 
Hegel has done and the Hegelian school did again and again the advantage is gained 
that it seems as if through logic the highest were already reached, or, if one prefers, 
the lowest.”
31 Adolph Peter Adler Populaire Foredrag over Hegels objective Logik, Copenhagen 
1842. Ktl. 383.
32 See Jon Stewart, Kierkegaard’s Relations to Hegel Reconsidered, New York: Cam-
bridge University Press 2003, pp. 380-385.
33 CA, 16; SKS 4, 323.
34 CA, 19; SKS 4, 326: “With dogmatics begins the science that…proceeds from 
actuality.”
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a state (de potentia), it is not, but de actu or in actu it is, again and 
again.”35 Here an attempt is made to flesh out the larger sphere of 
actuality and distinguish it from abstract thinking. Interesting, there 
is an appeal here to Schelling’s concept of potential as a concept.
Mention is made of Schelling’s lectures in Berlin in a footnote to 
the term “first philosophy.” Here we read, “Schelling called attention 
to this Aristotleian term in support of his own distinction between 
negative and positive philosophy. By negative philosophy he meant 
‘logic’: that was clear enough. On the other had, it was less clear to 
me what he really meant by positive philosophy, except insofar as 
it became evident that it was the philosophy that he himself wished 
to provide. However, since I have nothing to go by except my own 
opinion, it is not feasible to pursue this subject further.”36 One can 
hear in this a slightly critical tone with respect to the vagueness 
of Schelling’s own position, the proposed positive philosophy. For 
Kierkegaard, this should have been an existential account of the 
sphere of existence and actuality, but this was clearly not what 
Schelling was interested in exploring. His own view, which he wanted 
to oppose Hegel’s abstract conceptual analysis, remained unclear.
IV. Actuality in the Concluding Unscientific Postscript
In the Concluding Unscientific Postscript the account of actuality 
takes on much larger dimensions in connection Johannes Climacus’ 
famous distinction between objective and subjective knowing. In 
this work he develops his theory of the subjective appropriation of 
the objective.37 In this context it is clear that the terms actuality and 
existence fall squarely on the side of the subjective. 
In this text Kierkegaard repeats in a more polemical tone the 
criticism that he issued in The Concept of Anxiety about the confusion 
of spheres involved when one attempts to incorporate actuality 
into a system of science or concepts: “So-called pantheistic systems 
35 CA, 15; SKS 4, 323.
36 CA, 21n; SKS 4, 328n.
37 CUP1, p. 21; SKS, vol. 7, p. : “The inquiring, speculating, knowing subject ac-
cordingly asks about the truth but not about the subjective truth, the truth of appro-
priation. Accordingly, the inquiring subject is indeed interested but is not infinitely, 
personally, impassionedly interested in his relation to this truth concerning his own 
eternal happiness.” CUP1, p. 22; SKS, vol. 7, p. : “With regard to the subject’s rela-
tion to known truth, it is assumed that if only the objective truth has been obtained, 
appropriation is an easy matter; it is automatically included as part of the bargain, 
and am Ende the individual is a matter if indifference. Precisely this is the basis of the 
scholar’s elevated calm and the parroter’s comical thoughtlessness.”
arS BrEviS 2011
251
thE notion oF actuaLity in KiErKEgaard and SchELLing’S inFLuEncE
have frequently been cited and attacked by saying that they cancel 
freedom and the distinction between good and evil. This is perhaps 
expressed just as definitely by saying that every such system 
fantastically volatilizes the concept existence. But this should be said 
not only of pantheistic systems, for it would have been better to 
show that every system must be pantheistic simply because of the 
conclusiveness. Existence must be annulled in the eternal before the 
system concludes itself.”38 He continues, “No existing remainder may 
be left behind, not even such a tiny dingle-dangle as the existing Herr 
Professor who is writing the system. But the issue is not presented 
this way. No, the pantheistic systems are contested, partly with 
tumultuous aphorisms that again and again promise a new system, 
partly with a compilation that is supposed to be a system and has a 
separate paragraph in which it is declared that emphasis is placed on 
the concepts ‘existence’ and ‘actuality.” That such a paragraph mocks 
the entire system, that instead of being a paragraph in the system 
it is an absolute protest against the system, is of no consequence 
to busy systematic triflers. If the concept of existence is actually to 
be emphasized, this cannot be stated directly in a paragraph in a 
system….That existence is actually emphasized must be expressed 
in an essential form, and in relation to the illusiveness of existence 
this is an indirect form—that there is no system.”39
V. Critical Evaluation
It is clear that Kierkegaard rejects idealism since he believes that it 
fails to capture the realm of actuality. Kierkegaard enjoins us to focus 
on this realm and not lose sight of it. This realm is characterized by 
things such as passion, consciousness of sinfulness, mortality, etc. 
The question remains about the merits of this as a philosophical 
criticism.
It seems that this criticism betrays a misunderstanding of the nature 
of philosophy, if indeed it is intended as a philosophical criticism in 
the first place. A philosophical theory, like any theory is an attempt 
to understand a certain object domain by means of an ideal, a 
rule or explanatory principle. Thus, there are always two elements 
involved: first there is a seemingly chaotic object domain that is full 
of disorderly individual items or events. The characteristic feature of 
this first element is particularity. Second, there is the realm of the idea 
38 CUP1, 122; SKS 7, 117f.
39 CUP1, 122f.; SKS 7, 118.
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or the rule or principle which attempts to bring order to the chaos of 
the particulars. The characteristic feature of this realm is universality. 
All attempts at understanding and giving an account of something 
operate with these two elements: particularity and universality. It is 
thus no accident that the entire history of philosophy can be told 
as the story of the different ways of understanding the relation of 
the universal to the particular. One might well argue that Hegel’s 
conception of the Idea is too abstract, but it is a universal principle 
intended to explain individual phenomena, and thus constitutes 
a part of a philosophical theory of the way things hang together. 
What then is Kierkegaard’s proposal? He proposes that we dwell 
on the particular and avoid the seduction of the universal, which 
always ultimately distorts the particular and the realm of actuality. 
He thus seems to want to resist any attempt to give an account of 
the realm of particularity with any kind of principle or theory. But 
to reject this altogether is ultimately to reject all philosophy and all 
scientific account giving. It is then not clear what he is left with. Is 
he advocating an absurdly exaggerated form of empiricism, arguing 
that only the concrete individual things are real, and all ideas or 
ways of understanding them are nonsense? Here one can see that his 
position leads in the direction of an implausible kind of empiricism 
which insists on the irreducibility of individual things.
Some insight on this can be garnered when he take a step back 
and consider his motivation with his writing. His goal is to give his 
readers, albeit for the most part indirectly, some insight into the 
radical meaning of what it is to be a Christian. It is in this context 
that he enjoins us to focus on ourselves as irreducible individuals, 
which makes perfect sense given his view of the nature of the 
Christian message and the obligation of each individual to take 
a stand on it of either faith or offense. However, it will be noted 
that this is not a philosophical theory. There is no theory of each 
particular Christian. This is indeed the whole point. Each person 
must appropriate the Christian message by him- or herself. There 
is no simple way to faith that a theory might facilitate. Thus what 
might appear as bad philosophy ends up looking like an at least 
somewhat plausible view of what it means to be a Christian.
In Kierkegaard studies, it is sometimes claimed that Kierkegaard’s 
great insight lies in the realization that the problem of the universal 
and particular cannot be resolved by metaphysics, but needs to be 
grasped in the realm of one’s own personal existence. This is why 
the entire history of philosophy, sticking doggedly to metaphysics, 
has failed to resolve the problem. This also recalls a passage from the 
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Postscript, namely, where Climacus criticizes the Hegelian doctrine of 
mediation for being hollow since the terms that are to be mediated 
are both in thought; thus thought is mediated with thought, which is 
a tautology and not true mediation. One cannot resolve the universal-
particular problem by mediating two universals. By shifting the issue 
over into the realm of subjectivity and faith, according to this view, 
Kierkegaard has managed to solve this age-old philosophical problem. 
The question is whether or not this is a genuine solution to the 
problem. In the history of philosophy the problem has traditionally 
been understood as how to find the correct relation or status of the 
two terms, universal-particular. This means that both terms need to 
be present in any solution; hence Climacus’ criticism of Hegelian 
mediation would, if accurate, be a good one since Hegel ends up 
with just universals and no particulars. The problem I wish to suggest 
with Kierkegaard’s solution on this view is that he ends up with 
only particulars. In faith it is a question of particulars: a particular 
believer, a particular God and a particular relation between the two. 
God relates to the individual as one individual to another. There is 
no universal in this relation. Hence, one seems to end up here with 
a manifold of particularity and not a resolution to the problem of 
universal and particular. 
If his view is intended to be a solution to the philosophical 
problem, then it appears to be conceptually confused. There can be 
no science of the particular. Kierkegaard wants an exclusive focus 
on the faith of the individual, but there is no logos in this. Science 
cannot be about particulars in this sense. But he seems to recognize 
this by indicating that this is an area that science cannot encroach 
upon. Thus the confusion arises perhaps by ascribing to him a 
philosophical theory instead of seeing him as a Christian thinker 
developing a challenging theory of Christian faith. It is perhaps for 
this reason that thinkers such as Hegel or Schelling could not hold 
his attention for long.
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